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ABSTRACT
Nations without the distinct legal status of statehood have become increasingly important in the
domestic politics of some European countries. Recent secession referenda in various countries (most
notably Spain and the United Kingdom) have highlighted this trend. This study examines the impact that
sub-state national identities have on the disbursement of intergovernmental transfer payments in two
unitary states: the Netherlands and Spain. These cases were selected to conduct a “most different
systems” analysis and examined transfers from the central governments to their respective highest levels
of regional governance in the period between 2010 and 2018.
Established theory on the interaction between identity and institutions supports the hypothesis
that regions with more distinct separate identities will receive preferential treatment from their state
governments than those without. This study used support for sub-state nationalist parties as a proxy
measure for relative strength of their respective identities, which combined with the independent fiscal
capacity of the regions was regressed against the amount of transfers received to understand any
relationship that might exist.
The results of the analysis of these variables indicates that although they are more effective
predictors in Spain, there is a significant positive relationship in both countries between sub-state national
identities and intergovernmental transfer payments. Individual analysis of the Netherlands found that,
counter to established theory on intergovernmental transfers, regions with higher fiscal capacities also
received more transfers from the government. Analysis of Spain found that, with a couple of notable
exceptions, regions with higher degrees of sub-state nationalism received more transfers from the central
government. This study fills gaps in the literature that previously did not specifically examine the
relationships between these variables and highlights some areas for future study, both at smaller caselevels and broader scales.
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
1.1 – Key Terms and Scope
One key premise of a state, and subsequently the international system as a whole, is the
existence of distinct national identities. Occasionally denominated as nation-state, this term is
largely synonymous with the shortened "state" label. The terms are often interchangeable given
that virtually all current states have (though to varying degrees) national identities associated
with them. An important distinction comes when the words are separated. A state is a legal entity
which has the ability to exercise sovereignty over a permanent population within a well-defined
territory. 1 A nation, however, is a common group identity which may or may not have a bearing
on the legal entity within which that group resides. Simply put, a state is a legal entity based on
the people and territory under its control, and a nation (or national identity) is a group of people
who identify themselves based on a common ethnicity, culture, or occasionally language. 2 A
group of people, for example Indigenous peoples of Canada or Kurdish people in the Middle
East, may belong to a nation which does not have legal status as a state. This is considered a
"non-state" or "sub-state" nation, which is the focus of this study. 3
The concept of sub-state nationalism is extremely important in Europe. Its long history of
conflicts and malleable borders combined with the sheer number of sub-state national identities
make it a prime example for academic study. Though many states in Europe have undergone
transitions in and out of democracy, the sub-states nations have largely remained consistent over
its history. From a normative institutionalist perspective, the exceptionality of Europe makes this

Shannon L. Blanton and Charles W. Kegley, “Interpreting World Politics” in World Politics: Trend and
Transformation, (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2010): 16-17
2
ibid, 17
3
ibid
1
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particular focus of study not only interesting, but relevant to the study of both identity politics
and international relations.
The importance of nationalism in the study of political science, with specific regard to its
interaction in the regional and global economic systems is exemplified in not only historical
observations, but the modern geopolitical climate. Sub-state nationalism has been politically
relevant in virtually every state where it exists, and in many cases has led to substantive domestic
political changes. Quebec for example has seen its separate national identity fundamentally shift
the political environment of Canada numerous times in the past 60 years. From the FLQ and
militant separatism in the 1960’s, to today where the Quebec nationalist party, the Bloc
Québécois, holds almost ten percent of the seats in Canada’s parliament. 4 Although, as
demonstrated with the example of Canada, sub-state nationalism is apparent in many states, the
European example is exceptional due to its extensive and complex history. The impact of substate nationalism is of growing importance to the field of political economy and identity studies,
and this project will provide a useful examination of the fields.
1.2 - Research Design and Methods
This study seeks to answer a single overarching question: does the amount of sub-state
nationalist sentiment within a state have an impact on the disbursement of intergovernmental
transfer payments from their respective central governments? This question will be answered
under a normative institutionalist theoretical framework to understand the power relations
between the overarching central state government and the sub-state nations which exist within
the regions of the countries being examined. The research will focus on two European states;

"Federal Election 2019 Live Results," CBCnews, accessed February 6, 2021,
https://newsinteractives.cbc.ca/elections/federal/2019/results/
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Spain, and the Netherlands. These countries were selected based on the pervasiveness of regional
sub-state nationalism, with Spain having perceptually high levels in general, and The
Netherlands having comparatively low levels. Despite these differences, both are unitary states
which contain at least some amount of regional identity and language groups. This study is
employing the most-different case study design as a means of comparing the differences in
variable interaction observed in systems that, while similar in some fundamental ways, are
largely divergent in critical aspects.
The analysis will be conducted using the individual regions receiving financial payments
from their central governments, either through capital grants or equalization schemes as the cases
for study. The time-series data will also be analyzed separately to highlight any potential trends
in this data. The selection of the regions being studied are the Spanish autonomous communities
and the Dutch provinces as both are comparatively equal units of analysis in terms of their size
and relative populations. The provinces of Spain are not comparable to any regional body in the
Netherlands, and the municipalities are not particularly relevant to this study. Throughout this
paper, the term “region” may be used to refer to either a Spanish autonomous community or a
Dutch province.
The study will be conducted based on three specific variables. The dependent variable for
this study is the amount of transfers received by regional governments from their respective
national governments (β0). The value of β0 will be comprised of different aggregates for each
country as explained in Chapter Four. This will then be analyzed against the independent
variables, which will be the percentage of votes attained by sub-state nationalist parties in their
respective regional elections (β1) and the relative wealth of the regions (β2). Both of these
independent variables will be compared to the dependent variable using linear regressions, t
3

tests, and f tests to determine the significance of the variables. 5 The data will be analyzed over a
period of nine years; from 2010 until 2018. The collection will begin in 2010 because that is the
first year following changes to the Spanish equalization system. Since the Netherlands has not
made any substantial changes to their system, this year provides a more uniform comparison
between both countries and would eliminate the variable of legal changes to the system. The
dataset will end in 2018 as that is the last year where data for both countries is publicly available.
The hypothesis (H1) for this study is that a relationship will be observed between the
dependent variable and both independent variables (β0 = β1 + β2 ≠ 0). The null hypothesis of this
study is that no change will be observed in the dependent variable when regressed against the
independent variables (β0 = β1 + β2 = 0).
1.3 - Limitations
The very nature of this study examines the fiscal relationships between regions and their
national level governments. While historical backgrounds and other intricacies may be briefly
discussed, they will not be the focal point of this study. Therefore, while some relationships may
be established, there could be other factors which influence the amount of intergovernmental
transfers which are not included in this study. 6 Furthermore, the study is limited to the cases
being presented and may not be generalizable to other countries given the highly unique nature
of many regional-state relationships.

Each procedure will be explained in more detail in the Fifth Chapter.
Other factors may include emergencies requiring central financial assistance to the regions, unique events which
received one-off central funding, economic distress in a region (or the country as a whole), among others.

5
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CHAPTER TWO – REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 – Understanding the Nation
Prior to defining the scope of the term “nationalism” as it will be operationalized for this
study, debate on the creation and origin of nationalism and the nation must be explored. Benedict
Anderson outlines a rather pessimistic view of the concept of a nation, describing it as an
“imagined community”, both limited and sovereign. 7 It is “imagined” because those within it do
not, and will never know the vast majority of the other members. 8 Further, the nation is limited
in the sense that it is contained within a finite area, and sovereign as nations have slowly
transitioned from divine hierarchical dynasticism to more direct popular rule. 9 Anderson asserts
that the origins of these imagined communities partially arose from this transition, as many
during the enlightenment began to seek new meaning for their own mundanity and mortality. 10
This led to the creation of the overall concept of the imagined community, where regardless of
inequalities or exploitation, the nation is viewed as a community based on “deep, horizontal
comradeship” that millions of people will kill and die for. 11
One particularly interesting example given by Anderson to illustrate the importance of
the nation is how early colonizers in the Americas engaged in more cultural than physical
extermination. The views expressed through the practice of cultural destruction in the Americas
describe a substantial reverence of the very concept of a nation; if the cultural origins of the
nation derive from the attribution of meaning to one’s death, then the murder of indigenous

Benedict Anderson, “Introduction” in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, Revised Edition (London, UK: Verso Books, 2006): 6
8
Ibid
9
Ibid, 7
10
Ibid, 11
11
Ibid, 7
7
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persons would only strengthen their nations. 12 The colonizers viewed assimilation and dilution of
indigenous culture as the primary method for eliminating existing nations on the continent. This
is fundamentally important for understanding contemporary nationalism, especially as it relates
to the historical conflict between many state and sub-state actors and the development of regional
identities.
An opposing view to this was famously proposed by Anthony D. Smith through his
examinations of the origins and development of nations and identities. His view focuses on the
historical and cultural developments which lead to the creations of identities and the various
elements which comprise an overarching national identity. Smith underscores the plurality of
factors by highlighting how, in some cases such as with Germany and Switzerland, religion may
divide otherwise similar ethno-linguistic populations. 13 Using the example of ancient Greece,
Smith demonstrates that different types of identity can exist – and in fact often coexist within a
society. While there was no formal “Greek” nation, there was a Greek community which was
comprised of culturally and linguistically Hellenic peoples irrespective of their legal status
within their different city-states. 14 This duality is commonly understood as the difference
between civic and ethnic nationalisms.
To Smith, the civic model of a nation is a fundamentally western conception based
primarily on the spatial and territorial element. 15 Not only must the territory be clearly
demarcated, but it must have historic linkages to those who inhabit it while being culturally
significant. 16 A civic nation must also possess what Smith denotes as a patria; common political

Ibid, 14
Anthony D. Smith, “Introduction” in National Identity (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1991): 7
14
Ibid, 8
15
Ibid, 9
16
Ibid
12
13
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institutions and wills representing those inhabitants of the aforementioned lands, such as was
observed with the unification of the provinces of the Netherlands to defend against Habsburg
rule in the late 16th century. 17 Similarly, the nation must also guarantee common legal rights to
its inhabitants which represent common values among the population. 18 While the civic model of
the nation is more conceptually relevant for the analysis of variables in this study, the ethnic
conception of the nation remains relevant .
The “non-western” model of the nation differs principally in the emphasis placed on
native culture and one’s birth into it. 19 Unlike in the civic model, individuals cannot choose the
nation to which they belong – even if one emigrates from the physical nation, they will remain
irrevocably linked to their ethnic nationality. 20 Smith argues that the laws are typically less
important than language, custom, and culture in ethnic nations. 21 Instead, the community is
motivated by shared histories and myths in their national aspirations, making society more
susceptible and enticing for populist leaders. 22 In his analysis, Smith does recognize that these
are more general theories which cannot be applied entirely to every situation, and states that all
nations have, to varying degrees, elements of both ethnic and civic models. 23 This blend
typically will contain the following: historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a
common culture, uniform legal rights and duties for members, and a common economy with
territorial mobility. 24 These elements are critical to understanding the composition of a nation,
and perhaps even more so to understanding the operation and development of sub-state nations.

Ibid, 10
Ibid, 11
19
Ibid
20
Ibid
21
Ibid
22
Ibid
23
Ibid, 13
24
Ibid, 14
17
18
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This construction of the nation also imparts credibility to the idea that state institutions have the
ability to fundamentally transform the identities contained within them and conversely the
nation’s ability to alter the state’s behaviour.
2.2 – Nationalism
The overall sentiment of nationalism as it is contemporarily understood is divergent from
its theoretical origins. Nationalism is beyond merely an affinity towards one’s nation as could be
understood from Anderson or Smith. While there are varying degrees to the intensity of the
expression of nationalism, in their article examining identity in a united Germany, Blank and
Schmidt provide an excellent umbrella to understand the concept of modern nationalism. The
authors note that nationalism (and its degrees of intensity) is a form of expression of one's
national identity. 25 Nationalism is a primarily staunch support of one's nation which often rejects
ambivalent or negative opinions of it. 26 Nationalism can also be exclusionary, holding a
perception that members of said group have unique qualities of superiority. This can but does not
always result in the derogation of members of outgroups based on these feelings. 27 Such
sensitivities fit more closely with Smith’s definition of ethnic nationalism, as it leaves less room
for mobility and inclusion.
While this definition can be considered as encompassing, albeit at a rather basic level, the
current popular definition of nationalism, it does not necessarily represent the concept of substate nationalism which will be applied to this study. The aforementioned article includes the
possibility for the expression of nationalism to varying intensities. Dekker et al expand on this by

Thomas Blank and Peter Schmidt, "National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An
Empirical Test with Representative Data," Political Psychology 24, no 2 (June 2003): 291
26
Ibid, 292
27
Ibid, 294
25
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propounding that the expression of nationalistic tendencies functions as a hierarchy, with
positive and negative types, as well as intensity of expression. 28 They also differentiate between
different focuses of nationalistic tendencies, such as regional-national pride, European pride, and
internationalism. 29 This article also lays a useful foundation for the definition of sub-state
nationalism. This phenomenon occurs when individuals have a positive attitude from one focus
(regional pride, for example) and a negative focus from another, such as national pride. 30 The
example given in the article is Basque regional nationalism with negative attitudes toward
Spain. 31 Therefore, sub-state nationalism can be understood as positive attitudes toward one's
specific region which exist simultaneously with negative feelings toward the higher state-level
nation. What might cause these negative feelings will of course differ between cases, and even
individuals. The intensity of them will also vary between each. Further, it is also possible for
those with stronger regional identities to not have negative feelings towards other levels of
identity but simply for their feelings towards their region to be more positive or intense than
others.
What must be further be understood for the scope of this study is that sub-state
nationalism is not necessarily linked with ideals and goals of separatism from their governing
national sovereign. In many cases, the dominant sub-state nationalistic rhetoric centres around
complex redefinitions of sovereignty, representation, and recognition within the state. 32 Within
the current international system, sub-state nations are becoming more interested in playing roles

Henk Dekker et al, "Nationalism and its Explanations," Political Psychology 24, no 2 (June 2003): 347
Ibid, 348
30
Ibid
31
Ibid, 349
32
Stephen Tierney, "Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the
Nation-State ," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 54, no 1 (January 2005): 162
28
29
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of greater importance, with special regard to international organizations. 33 Such changes bear
relevance to potential future studies given the relevance of the EU in domestic European politics.
Taking on an increasingly supranational role, the EU is gradually shifting the very paradigm of
European governance to a post-Westphalian model that emphasizes to a greater extent the
prominence of sub-state nations. 34 It is also important for this study because the aim is not to
assess likelihood of separatism, or how internal funding allocations may interact with desires for
separation.
2.3 - Sub-State Nations and Regions
The legal distinction between a sub-state nation’s governance and other levels of
governance are of great importance to this study. As has been already outlined, although the
significance of a sub-state nation is not limited to its recognition within a state as a legal entity,
there are many times where they overlap. In many cases, at least in the West (and in particular
Europe), they take the form of a legal entity at a certain level of government within a state.
Quebec, Catalonia, Basque Country, Northern Ireland, and Scotland (to name a few) are all
prominent sub-state nations that have legal recognition as regional entities within their respective
states. While each region’s legal positioning within their respective states varies with the
governance system of the country, they all represent a level of government that operates at a
regional level, which is critical to understanding this concept.
Under a system of federalism (which Spain is increasingly moving towards),
representation is affected through the organization of overlapping social groups and communities

33
34

Ibid, 163
Ibid, 164
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that are tasked with electing different, and often competing bodies of representation. 35 It can also
lead to complex, territorially based identities that are a result of tiered governance. 36 The result
of any system that has separate levels of governance (and subsequently different legislatures) is
the existence of competing interests within the region. Take the example of Quebec which, as
part of the federal Canadian system, utilizes the powers given to it through its legislature to
entrench its national identity, culture, and language within its society. 37 Quebec’s history is one
of abundant conflict within the federal system, and it is not alone in this. Catalonia’s identity,
which has origins long pre-dating most, has recovered from the era of Franco (1936-1975) by
utilizing its position within the increasingly disintegrating unitary system of Spain to demand
increased autonomy and internal authority. 38
Catalonia’s position within the Spanish system is a gleaming example of the separation of
the identity from the legal, state entity. According to Keating, Catalan nationalism often crosses
the political spectrum and historically clashes on the bases of class identity. 39 As illustrated by
Hamann, this is a clear demarcation that is necessitated by any tiered system of government that
creates competing social groups with different interests at the state and regional levels. While
nationalist parties may have great successes when their popularity is aggregated, there is still
significant competition between them given the nature of the system they interact in. The
institutionalization of regional governance on the basis of identity is incredibly important for this

Kerstin Hamann, “Federalist Institutions, Voting Behaviour, and Party Systems in Spain,” Publius 29, no 1
(Winter 1999): 112
36
Ibid
37
Michael Keating, “Quebec” in Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia
and Scotland, (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996): 69
38
Keating, “Catalonia,” 123
39
Ibid
35
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study, as it not only can play a role in the financing of these systems, but it can fundamentally
alter the lens through which the concept is examined.
2.4 – Factors Influencing Intergovernmental Transfers
2.4.1 – Structure of Government and Constitution
The governance structure of any two states will be different, and as such will play a role
in how money is distributed and spent within the country. The decentralization of governance
varies significantly between states; for example, regional governments in Italy collect no taxes
from their citizens, but state-level governments in the United States are responsible for
approximately 48% of all taxation in the country. 40 How each state, and subsequently each
region is governed is a critical factor in whether or not a region will receive payments from the
central government at all, as well as how much they will receive. Highlighting Canada as an
example – its internally controversial system of equalization payments between provinces are
constitutionally enshrined in its federal system. 41 In the European context, Germany also has a
constitutionally mandated system for distributing money to the component states of the federal
system. In this case. some distribution follows fixed quotas, while certain funds are allocated
(per the constitution) in an attempt at maintaining equality between states. 42 Per Article 107 of
the German Constitution, there must be financial equalization between state governments to
ensure relatively uniform living conditions and public services throughout the entire country. 43
German states can also apply for “supplementary central government grants” for special projects,

Tim Bale, "From Government to Governance" in European Politics: A Comparative Introduction, (London, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 73
41
Robin Broadway and Frank Flatters, "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government:
A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," The Canadian Journal of Economics 15, no 4 (November 1982): 614
42
Deutsche Bundesbank, “The Reform of Financial Relations in the German Federal System”, Monthly Reports
(September 2014): 34
43
Ibid, 38
40

12

which can theoretically create inequality between states so long as the grant is not discriminatory
in nature. 44 These grants are occasionally given to reduce general horizontal fiscal imbalance
between regions, but are more often distributed in order to directly alleviate the burdens caused
by the former partitioning of the country into East and West Germany. 45
While each state is organized differently, and their formulas or methods of calculation
may vary, the general principle remains the same in that the structure of the government and
fiscal regulations will play a significant role in the intergovernmental transfer of funds. This is
notable in both Canada and Germany and is largely applicable to most de-centralized
governments. Both Spain and the Netherlands, the cases for this study, are de-centralized unitary
states whose systems of equalization and intergovernmental transfers will be examined more
specifically in the next chapter.
2.4.2 – Political Factors
Despite its constitutional validity in many states, intergovernmental transfer payments can
create much domestic strife. Within federal systems, equalization is bound to evoke discontent
from some actors. In Canada this discontent devolved into intergovernmental conflict in 2004,
with multiple Premiers publicly attacking the federal government. 46 While they are not the only
province who benefits from transfer payments, Quebec was the first province to champion such a
plan to the federal government. 47 The 2004 conflict embodies the intertwining of politics and
monetary redistribution, as many believe the changes made by the Harper government were an

Ibid, 41
Ibid
46
André Lecours and Daniel Béland, "Federalism and Fiscal Policy: The Politics of Equalization in Canada,"
Publius 40, no 4 (Fall 2020): 570
47
Ibid, 575
44
45
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attempt at winning seats in the regions that most benefited from alterations to the equalization
structure. 48
Once again examining literature on Quebec, it is clear that the level of social programmes
available to residents positively correlates with their level of nationalism, or at least positive
identification with the Québécois identity. 49 During periods of reduction in federal funding and
subsequently social development, Quebec saw increased rates and intensity of nationalism. 50
Such a trend would also lend support to the relationship between nationalism and economic
organization. Similar to what has been observed in Canada, the central government in the UK
created a regional development agency for Scotland in 1965 almost entirely due to nationalist
pressures and rising popularity of the Scottish National Party (SNP). 51 Ten years later, a larger
and more comprehensive agency was created, again in response to mounting support for Scottish
nationalism. 52 This demonstrates the role that national and sub-national politics play on the
structure and formation of institutions and their mandates.
2.5 – Institutions and the Development of National Identity
One distinctly pertinent theoretical conceptualization by Michael Keating discusses in
detail the intertwining of markets, capital, and nationalism. Keating links nationalism with
capitalism by highlighting that transitions to capitalist economies were often motivated by and
exercised through the agency of the state. 53 One of the principal motivations of nationalism as it

Ibid, 581
Daniel Béland and André Lecours, "Sub-State Nationalism and the Welfare State: Quebec and Canadian
Federalism," Nations and Nationalism 12, no 1 (2006): 83
50
Ibid, 87
51
Hubert Rioux Ouimet, "From Sub-state Nationalism to Subnational Competition States: The Development and
Institutionalization of Commercial Paradiplomacy in Scotland and Quebec," Regional and Federal Studies 25, no 2
(2015): 114
52
Ibid
53
Keating, “Nations, Nationalism and the State,” 11
48
49
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relates to capitalist systems is the ability to provide a common objective and sense of belonging
to previously disenfranchised or marginalized groups left behind by economic inequality. 54 In
these cases, nationalism is used to counter the disintegrative and fractal nature of capitalist
economies and fiscal institutions, which outlines how these societal institutions are indivisible
from the nations and identities operating within them. 55
Additional theory from Rabindranath Tagore supports this postulation. His theoretical
approach to nationalism in the west is largely focused on social organization and cooperation
through economic intentions. As a political movement, Tagore believes that nationalism is
ultimately designed as a motif of self-preservation. 56 It is often connected to the organization of
economic power, with national groups seeking to secure more resources and benefits from their
society, which clearly fits within the scope and relevance of this study. 57
In his article on why sub-state nationalism is prevalent in the West, Lecours offers six
explanations; one of which is that national identity becomes institutionalized through
decentralized governance of regions. 58 With greater autonomy, sub-state nations will receive not
only increased legitimacy within their populations, but also the ability to create policies and
discourse which further promotes the idea of a distinct nation. 59 A sub-state region which can
provide for its citizens will further the notion amongst them that they could exist independently
as a legitimate legal entity. The same can also be said of the reverse; where a lack of recognition
(of language or autonomy for example) can embolden nationalists within a region, further
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increasing the prevalence of national identity politics. 60 Immigration policy is a specific policy
which can have an impact on national identities. In some communities, such as Catalonia in
Spain, internal policies are exclusionary and assimilationist which aim to consolidate and protect
the sub-state national identity of the region. 61 This is especially prevalent in regions whose
national identity is tied to ethnicity and language, as is the case in the Basque Country and
Catalonia.
The Scottish Development Agency created by the British government in 1975 is an
example of the intertwining of nationalism and institutions. The institution, created as a purely
domestic agency, was quickly used to subvert British diplomatic relations and establish offices
throughout Europe, the USA, and Japan. 62 While this effort was short-lived, its controversy did
bring about a new agency for the express purpose of attracting international economic
investment into Scotland. 63 This example illustrates not only the impact that nationalism has on
the institutions of the nation and state, but the impact that the institutions have on developing the
national identity. By utilizing the institutions at hand, Scotland was able to gain greater
representation and legitimacy within the international community.
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CHAPTER THREE – COUNTRY PROFILES
3.1 – The Netherlands
Like some countries in Europe, the Netherlands operates as a unitary state whereby the
central government may create, abolish or reorganize lower levels of government. 64 The
Netherlands, like many states, has a national government (Seated in the Hague), twelve
provincial governments, and thousands of municipal governments. 65 The provinces are governed
through directly elected provincial legislatures which serve for four year terms. 66 Local
government in the Netherlands depends on the size of the municipality, but all are governed
through municipal councils comprised of seven to 45 elected members that serve for four year
terms. 67
3.1.1 – Identities and Consociationalism
Despite the Netherlands’ historically territorial unity, there have existed, prominently
since the 1800s, deep societal division on the basis of both class and religious lines. 68 The
principal resolution for such persistent divisions in the Netherlands came in the form of
consociational democracy. 69 This system of governance, coined by political scientist Arend
Lijphart, does not function on the principle of majority rule but instead requires consensus
building; often through so called “grand coalition cabinets”. 70 These grand coalition cabinets are
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a piece of the consensus-building puzzle by which there are clear and deliberate efforts by
competing political elites to stabilize the political system and, by extension, society as a whole. 71
Consociationalism was perhaps the most important factor in the mending and reconciliation of
societal tensions in the Netherlands, which has since transitioned away from the model. 72 What
truly sets the Netherlands apart from Spain is that these divisions were not based on a separate
national identity (or identities), but instead almost purely on the basis of class and religion. This
is a significant difference which has allowed for the continued equal devolution of powers in the
Netherlands, as well as the continual unity of a territorially based national identity.
The only notable exception to this is the province of Friesland. This northern littoral
province is unique in the Netherlands for having its own officially recognized language, though
Dutch is the dominant language in society and education. 73 Nevertheless, Frisian and its dialects
are still the native language of over half of the provincial population, and nearly 95 percent
claiming they can understand it. 74 In schools, Frisian is taught in the upper years, though since
education in the Netherlands is centralized there is no truly legal obligation to ensure equal or
adequate Frisian language instruction in the province. 75 There also does exist a Frisian identity
which bears many similarities to those regional identities in Spain. The sub-state identity of
Friesland is principally geographic in nature; tied to the sea and the coast. 76 Upon its
incorporation into the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, the perceived peripherization of
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Friesland has contributed to the development of a unified identity from what was previously a
broad umbrella of different Frisian identities. 77 With shared history, geographic ties, and a
unique language it is clear how Friesland bears resemblance to the sub-state nations of Spain.
There is one crucial difference where Friesland deviates from the examples in Spain, which is
that the shared social history and experiences do not revolve around the attempted repression by
the modern Dutch state. As a result, there have not been significant pushes by Frisians for greater
autonomy or full-fledged separatism from the Netherlands. This difference is critical to
understanding the degree to which nationalism affects decentralization in both the Netherlands
and Spain.
3.2.1 – Elections and Regional Parties
Another significant indicator that sub-state nationalism is not nearly as prevalent in the
Netherlands when compared to Spain is participation in regional governance. Representation of
regional nationalist parties in the 2003 Dutch provincial elections demonstrates regional
nationalism is weak at best, with only 12 of the 763 combined provincial seats filled by sub-state
nationalist or regionalist parties. 78 This trend has not changed in recent years, as the largest of the
regional parties, the Frisian National Party, only garnered four of a possible 43 seats in the 2019
provincial election compared to their seven in 2003. 79 Furthermore, there are no regional parties
represented at a national level. 80 Aside from Friesland, only six other regional parties received
above 0.1% of the vote share in the 2019 provincial elections. 81 The parties were: Lokaal
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Brabant, Groninger Belang, Lokaal-Limburg, Partij voor Zeeland, Partij voor het Noorden
(active in Friesland, Drenthe, and Groningen), 82 and Sterk Lokaal (Drenthe). 83 Compared to the
2019 elections, regional parties won a combined 15 seats; three more than in 2003. 84 This
demonstrates a consistently low level of support for regional parties in the Netherlands.
These low levels of support also ensure that regional parties in the Netherlands have a
negligible role in policy development both nationally and regionally. This is presented in stark
contrast with Spain, where the largest Catalan national party alone won 13 seats in the national
parliament in the 2019 Spanish elections. 85 In fact, regional nationalist parties in Spain combined
for 41 out of the 350 seats (12 percent) in the Spanish parliament. 86 It is also clear from current
data that citizen participation in Dutch provincial elections does not come remotely close to
regional participation in Spain, which has significantly higher turnout in the elections to
autonomous community parliaments. For example, Catalonia’s voter turnout has been increasing
steadily, reaching 82 percent in the 2017 elections. 87 Comparatively, the 2019 Dutch provincial
elections (which are all held simultaneously) saw turnout at a mere 56 percent of eligible
voters. 88 In fact, turnout for provincial elections is about on par with that of elections to
European Parliament. 89
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3.1.3 – Financial Regulations and Relationships
Decentralization efforts in the Netherlands began in 1982 and have led to progressively
more powers being devolved to sub-national authorities. 90 Notwithstanding the ongoing
devolution of powers, the 12 provinces are still the least impactful policymakers in the country. 91
Prior to 1985, local governments in the Netherlands raised only 7% of their revenue themselves;
leaving about 24% and 69% to be filled by revenue-sharing from the central government and
specific grants, respectively. 92 Revenue sharing in the Netherlands is disbursed through a
formula taking into account various factors such as a region’s population and relative financial
need. 93 There are, however, no special conditions attached to revenue sharing as is observed in
the case of grants; that is to say the funds may be appropriated for any project with no strings
attached from the central government. 94 As part of the devolution efforts from the Dutch
government, specific grants have fallen dramatically while revenue-sharing has become much
more relied upon. 95 Revenue sharing has increased to nearly 40% of local government income in
2003, while specialized grants fell to approximately 43%. 96 This means that, while the
discretionary funding from the central government is decreasing, the provinces are being
afforded more powers and freedom to spend their transfers as they see fit.
A 2019 report from the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands shows that the
trend of dependency has continued. Combined local government income across the Netherlands
totaled approximately €103bn in 2019; locally generated revenue comprised only €28.1bn
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(27.2%) of that, while €73.8bn (71.5%) came from national government transfers. 97 Of the EU28, The Netherlands ranked 7th highest in terms of non-locally generated income in 2019. 98 This
indicates that intergovernmental transfers are critical to economic development of Dutch regions,
making the Netherlands clearly viable for this study.
3.2 – Spain
Like the Netherlands, Spain is a unitary state which has recently begun an increased
devolution of powers to sub-national regional authorities. Unlike the Netherlands, however,
modern-day Spain is comprised of multiple historic kingdoms such as Valencia, Aragon, and
Castille. 99 Following the end of fascist dictatorial rule in the mid-1970s, the Spanish government
almost immediately began to devolve their powers and competences to the autonomous
communities; comparable to the provinces of the Netherlands. Under the 1978 constitution, each
of the 17 autonomous communities boasts a popularly elected parliament and government. The
powers afforded to them, however, depend entirely on the regions’ negotiations with the central
government. 100 The powers of the autonomous communities can be exercised as they see fit, so
long as it does not violate the constitution and remains committed to the “indivisible unity of the
Spanish Nation”. 101 It is here where many believe that the Spanish system is unfair, as many
autonomous communities cannot effectively exercise their rights to the extent that others (such
as the Basque Country) can. This has created a system dubbed by some experts as
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“Asymmetrical Federalism”, as some communities objectively have fewer rights than others
do. 102
3.2.1 – Sub-State National Identities and Separatism
This “Asymmetrical Federalism” is largely derivative from various contemporary substate nationalist movements, primarily from Basque and Catalonia. These two autonomous
communities have clear and distinct national identities which have both seen overt secessionist
movements. For Catalonia, their identity had been repressed significantly during Franco’s rule;
treated as an outside group within their own country. 103 A 2006 statute passed in the Spanish
lower house codified the Catalan identity within the country, declaring Catalonia a
“nationality”. 104 Although this was a significant step forward to formal recognition, the statute
was opposed by one of Catalonia’s prominent independence parties, the Esquerra Republicana
de Catalynya (ERC), on the basis that it did not go far enough. 105 Following its approval through
a Catalonian referendum the statute faced significant opposition from Spanish national parties,
who ultimately referred it to the country’s Constitutional Court. 106 In 2010, the court declared
some articles of the statute illegal, prompting not only massive protests against the Spanish
government, but a clear demarcation in discourse and public opinion within Catalonia towards
the central government. 107 This tension was palpable, with demonstrators declaring the
Constitutional Court “Francoist” and accusing the Spanish government of “robbing [them] of 60
million Euros a day”. 108
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By 2014, Spain had been labeled by both the Catalan government and civil society
organizations as an enemy, with prominent independence activists and civil society organizations
proclaiming the Spanish state as their “adversary”. 109 Catalonia has since launched several nonbinding referenda, most notably in 2014. 110 This referendum was a result of the Spanish lower
house rejecting a call from Catalonia for the devolution of powers giving the right to call a
referendum. 111 The referendum (referred to by the Catalan government as a “participatory
process”) prompted the Spanish Constitutional Court to once again aim its sights on the issue of
Catalan independence. In its 2014 decision, the court discussed the issue of the so called “right to
decide” and found that that the constitution provides a right to self-determination only so far as it
applies to the protected right to freedom of expression. 112 In essence, this decision legitimized
the Catalan people’s rights to decide their political fate but does not provide a legal avenue to
practically exercise it in order to secede from the Spanish union under the current constitution. 113
On October 1st, 2017, the Catalan government defied the decisions of the Spanish Constitutional
Court and called a binding referendum on independence which saw an overwhelming 90%
majority vote to leave the Spanish union. 114 The vote was subject to much international attention,
largely due to the overwhelmingly violent response by the Spanish government in their attempts
to suppress the vote. 115
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The other most notable example of sub-state national identity issues in Spain comes from
Basque Autonomous Community. Much akin to the case of Catalonia, the Basque struggles for
independence and identity did not begin with Franco but were certainly exacerbated during his
rule. 116 Unlike Catalonia, however, the response from Basque nationalist groups was violent;
amounting to what many people would contemporarily describe as terrorism. 117 Most famously,
the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was an armed Basque nationalist group that used violence in
an attempt at attaining independence from Spain. The actions of the ETA were directly
responsible for the deaths of more than 800 people from 1958 until a ceasefire brought upon their
dissolution in 2011. 118 Another key difference between the two is that traditional “Basque
Country” encompasses more than simply its autonomous community’s namesake; the ETA also
sought independence of the neighbouring Navarre Autonomous Community and some areas of
southern France which would then be unified as a single “Basque Country”. 119
These added complexities would theoretically contribute to increased levels of separatist
sentiment, however quite the opposite has been observed. While Catalan separatist efforts have
clearly grown in intensity, the same cannot be said for Basque Country. 120 In 2014, a study
conducted by the University of the Basque Country found that only 24 percent of respondents
had a desire to separate from Spain; down 13 percent from 2006. 121 This is in stark contrast with
what has been seen in Catalonia, where 57% were found to be in support of independence during
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the same year. 122 One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the special economic regime
that granted the Autonomous Communities of Basque and Navarre broad fiscal independence
from post-Francoist Spain. 123
3.2.2 – Regional Parties and Elections
As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, regional elections in Spain tend to be much more
prominent than in the Netherlands both in terms of voter turnout and in the number of parties
competing in regional and national elections. Catalonia alone has four regional nationalist parties
represented in their parliament as of their 2017 election, compared to six across the entire
country of the Netherlands. 124 Where Spain also significantly diverges from the Netherlands is in
the amount of representation attained by these regional identity-based parties. A large scale 2015
study by Filippo Tronconi examined regional parties in Italy and Spain and their participation in
governance. The study found that between 1979 and 2011, identity-based regional parties in
Spain had the opportunity to form government at the autonomous community level a combined
144 times. 125 What this means is that these parties in Spain were either a part of a governing
coalition or held a majority in their regional legislatures 144 times in the span of just over 30
years. This represents a clear differentiation to what has been observed in the Netherlands, where
such occurrences are generally rare.
While representation at the regional level is significant, attaining national recognition is
vastly more impactful for the promotion and furtherance of regional interests. It is here where
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Dutch provincial parties are even more divergent from those of the Spanish autonomous
communities. As previously discussed, there are no regional parties represented in the Dutch
lower house of representatives, whereas the Spanish lower house sees almost 12 percent of their
seats occupied by regional identity-based parties as of the November 2019 General Election.
These parties, represent the six autonomous communities of Catalonia, Basque Country,
Navarre, Canary Islands, Galicia, and Cantabria, as well as the Aragonese province of Teruel. 126
This representation allows for a direct voice in how the entire country is run, and promotes
regional concerns more effectively. This is particularly evident in Catalonian negotiations to
codify their identity in Spanish law, as regional parties played a significant part of the talks. It
also was especially relevant in the devolution of fiscal powers, especially in the case of Basque
Country.
3.2.3 – Fiscal Regulations and Relationships
The fiscal independence enjoyed by the Basque Country and Navarre is the most enjoyed
by any autonomous community in Spain. They are able to collect 100% of all taxes (with the
exception of customs duties), set regional spending programmes, and are reimbursed for the
VAT collected by the central government in Basque territory. 127 The rest of the country, which
does not fall under this so-called “foral regime”, operate under a specific scheme of tax-sharing
(referred to as the “common regime); a 50 percent split of personal income tax (plus
discretionary regional rates) and VAT, along with 58 percent of alcohol, tobacco and
hydrocarbon duties going to the regions. 128 These regions do collect 100 percent of all
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nationally-set rates (some of which are also subject to additional regional discretionary rates) on
electricity, oil, property tax, stamps, motor vehicles, as well as wealth and inheritance taxes. 129 In
stark contrast with the Netherlands, Spanish autonomous communities in 2018 raised just over
40 percent of their own revenues. 130 In fact, the Spanish autonomous communities rank second
amongst EU members in terms of locally generated revenue (including provinces and
municipalities) behind only the German Länder. 131 As a whole, Spanish sub-national government
spending (including provinces and municipalities) accounted for almost 80 percent of total
government spending while in the Netherlands, it was about one third. 132
This was not always the case, as until the early 1980s the vertical fiscal imbalance of the
central Spanish government was extremely high. 133 The issue of vertical fiscal imbalance in
Spain was easily addressed by implementing the aforementioned taxation and revenue sharing
schemes, however this cannot particularly address the issue of horizontal fiscal imbalance; where
there is inequality between the regions themselves. 134 Such issues cannot be solved through the
same mechanisms used to address vertical fiscal imbalances, and in fact are often exacerbated by
them. This is evident when examining the foral regime communities and their glaringly unequal
tax burden in comparison to the rest of the country. Residents of Basque and Navarre do not
share a remotely equal cost of centrally provided services but retain equal access to them
nonetheless. 135 Compounding this is the Ley Organica de Financiacion de las Comunidades
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Autonomas (LOFCA) which imposes strict regulations on taxation powers of the other 15
autonomous communities. 136 The LOFCA further emphasizes the necessity of intergovernmental
transfers between the central government and autonomous communities, as their powers are
largely limited to raise their own revenues.
Traditionally, intergovernmental transfers were based on need as determined by a
formula set out in the LOFCA. 137 The actual disbursement of funds, however, was often
bilaterally negotiated between the Spanish government and each autonomous community
separately due to the central government’s inability to accurately assess the criteria needed to
complete the LOFCA formula. 138 This was the norm until 2009 when Spain introduced a reform
which altered the formula slightly by not counting revenue generated through regional taxes in
the final calculation of assets for equalization. 139 This new measure is extremely beneficial for
autonomous communities that have levied their own taxes – and especially for those who end up
having a negative transfer balance with the central government. The revision also includes
various non-fiscal factors such as population density, and whether there is a regional language
population requiring protection. 140 Much like other states that have equalization regimes, the
wealthier regions still tend to ostensibly bankroll the less fortunate ones in the interest ensuring
(at least as close as possible) equal access and quality of government services throughout the
country.
Spain, much like the Netherlands, also has a system of grant transfers, which are intended
to be used for the financing of (often specific) capital projects within a region. In the case of
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Spain, these transfers are made up of national fund programs such as the “Interterritorial
Compensation Fund” which all states contribute towards and are then redistributed. 141 Also like
the Netherlands, these grants are generally bilateral and discretionary on the part of the central
government, which differs from the general-purpose equalization scheme previously
discussed. 142 While these grants are often a small percentage of the total transfer payments to the
regions, they are significant enough to be discussed due to their discretionary nature. With the
central government allowed to expressly determine which regions get how much grant money,
this program is clearly relevant to this study.
3.3 – Comparability
While this equalization scheme differs from that which is practiced in the Netherlands,
the Spanish example is still quite clearly relevant for this study. As has been demonstrated, the
fiscal powers devolved to the autonomous communities are largely malleable. They can, and are,
changed to ensure more equity amongst the regions, and as such can also be changed for political
purposes; the inclusion of regional language factors in equalization payments is a notable
example of this. Both Spain and the Netherlands operate as unitary states, both have significant
regional governments (Dutch provinces and Spanish autonomous communities) and both have
transfer/equalization schemes that comprise the majority of regional revenues. Consequently,
Spain and the Netherlands are both viable for this study, and a fair comparison can be made
between the two for the purposes of analysis.
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CHAPTER FOUR – DATASET AND COLLECTION
4.1 – Fiscal Data
The dependent variable for this study is the amount of intergovernmental transfer
payments from the central governments to their respective regional governments. As discussed in
the previous chapter, such transfers are almost exclusively legally mandated, though there is
often flexibility; either through discretionary capital transfers or by amending the laws governing
such payments. The data has been collected through respective government websites and
budgetary documents. For both the Netherlands and Spain, the figures represented in this study
have been taken from data published by the central governments on the financing of regional
governments. Retrieving data from the central governments ensures that there is uniform
calculation between the different regions of a country. The wealth of the regions also is included
as an independent variable for this study to measure more accurately the relative impact that
intergovernmental transfers have on sub-state nationalism.
Under the transfer schemes of both countries, the regions with lower relative “wealth”
should, in theory, receive more in transfer payments than those with more. One of the largest
factors used in these calculations is a region’s internal revenue generation which usually comes
in the form of levied taxes. For the purposes of this study, internal revenue generation will be
used as a proxy value for the relative wealth of a region. This value is most suitable for this study
due to the fact it excludes external variables and focuses solely on a single institutional factor.
This proxy value fits within the theoretical framework of normative institutionalism, and
therefore is fitting to be used in the study. Internal revenue generation is most suitable to
represent the wealth of a region as it indicates a region’s independent ability to provide services
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for its population. All data collected from each region in both countries will be represented in
millions of Euros unless otherwise specified.
4.1.2 – The Netherlands
For analysis of the Netherlands, all twelve mainland provinces will be examined given
that each operates under a common fiscal regime as determined by the central government.
Overseas territories of the Netherlands will not be included in this study as they do not fit within
its parameters. Intergovernmental transfers from the central government to the provincial
governments for the purposes of fiscal equalization are realized through the disbursement of the
“Provincial Fund”. 143 All data on intergovernmental transfers as part of the Provincial Fund were
taken from the provincial accounts page of the digital archives of the Central Bureau of Statistics
(CBS) of the Netherlands. 144 One important factor to reiterate regarding the Netherlands is the
level of regional decentralization. The Netherlands is still, despite their various devolutions since
the 1980s, one of the most centralized countries in Europe. Many policies are legislated at the
national level and their execution is then delegated to the lower levels. 145 Between the national,
provincial, and municipal levels of government, the provinces are by far the weakest in terms of
both legislative power and capacity to independently generate revenue. The vast majority of their
funding is through central government grants (general and specific), as no tax-sharing
programmes are present in the Netherlands. 146 This means that both the general-purpose grants
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(Provincial Fund) and specific grants are funded directly by income generated at the level of the
central government, and not a redistribution of provincial revenues.
One significant variable when discussing intergovernmental transfer payments in the
Netherlands is the role of the specific grants. 147 For the collection of this data, values were also
taken from the CBS archives of the provincial accounts. For this study, all figures represented
under the “benefits” column (with some exceptions) of the provincial accounts page will be
considered as originating from the central government. The exceptions to this are if it is
otherwise specified that the funds are derived from a different source, or if the origin is unclear.
An example of this can be found in the function of the “promotion of economic activities”,
which is explicitly said to contain investment incentives from the European Structural Funds. 148
The decision to include the rest of the figures is the interpretation of the Provincial Fund
description found in the table information annex of the CBS data, which reads:
The general payment from the provincial fund, including the pertaining integration
payments. Benefits not included in the above, such as the specific benefits, are posted to
the appropriate functions. The additions to provisions (which are / have been made for
liabilities and risks the size of which is uncertain but can be reasonably estimated) are
booked to the function for which the provision is made. 149
This passage, in conjunction with research on the funding structure on the provinces of the
Netherlands, invites an interpretation of the provincial “benefits” to be composed primarily of
specific grants. 150 While this means that the values included in the final analysis may differ
An explanation of the calculation for each variable of g can be found in Appendix 1.1
Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018
149
Ibid
150
A comprehensive list of provincial functions excluded from the calculation of benefits can be found with
explanations in Appendix 1.2
147
148
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slightly from the realized figures, it can be reasonably determined as statistically viable for study
given the nature of the available data and the limited clarity of explanations. The total value of
capital grants (g) will therefore be understood as:
9

� 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1

The value of provincial capacity was determined from the same data tables published by
the CBS, under the “own resources” row. 151 This amount is an aggregate of all provincial levies
collected by the governments, of which nearly the entirety is derived from the “motor vehicle
surcharge”. 152 This value will be represented both as its real value, and per capita.
4.1.3 – Spain
For the purposes of this study, the two autonomous cities of Spain, Ceuta and Melilla, are
not included in the dataset. As a unit of analysis, they do not fit within the parameters being used
for the study and therefore are being excluded. Furthermore, the autonomous communities of
Basque Country and Navarre are not included in this dataset due to their unique fiscal policy
compared to the common regime communities. Basque Country and Navarre are not recipients of
traditional equalization, and therefore cannot accurately be compared to the common regime
communities.
All budget settlement data for the common regime communities was gathered from the
digital archives of the Spanish Ministry of Finance – Ministerio de Hacienda from the “Reports
on the Definitive Financing of the Autonomous Communities”. The intergovernmental transfers
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Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018
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for the purposes of equalization are collected and distributed through various funds. Each
autonomous community’s contributions are determined through certain formulae and
calculations as determined by Spanish laws. The funds being considered for this study are the
Fondo Garantia (e1), the Fondo de Suficiencia Global (e2), the Fondo de Cooperacion (e3), and
the Fondo de Competitividad (e4). From these funds, the net equalization received by each
autonomous community (e) can be determined:
4

� 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1

The capital transfers received by the autonomous communities are found in budget
settlement tables provided by the Ministerio de Hacienda. As part of this program, Spain also
utilizes two specific transfers under the umbrella of the Fondo de Compensacion Interterritorial
(FCI); the Compensation Fund (c1) and the Complementary Fund (c2). 153 This data is found in the
budget settlement tables under codes 7003 and 7004, respectively. 154 While the purpose of these
funds is the reduction of horizontal fiscal imbalances, they are legally not part of the formal
system of equalization. They are only distributed to autonomous communities whose per capita
income level is below 75 percent of the EU average. 155 The other value for capital transfers
comes from code 7009, listed as “Other State Transfers” (c3). From here, the net amount of
capital transfers to regional governments can be determined (c):
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3

� 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1

The calculation of net transfers received from the central government (t) can therefore be
understood as:
� 𝑡𝑡 (𝑒𝑒, 𝑐𝑐)
𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐

The fiscal capacity of the autonomous communities was determined by adding their
“settled” tax resources with the “non-settled” tax resources. Settled resources are considered
personal income tax, VAT, and other shared taxes such as alcohol and tobacco. 156 Non-settled
resources are considered inheritance tax, taxes on donations, gambling tax, and transfer of
service fees. 157 This data was also retrieved from the reports on the definitive financing of the
autonomous communities. It is this data on fiscal capacity which partially informs the
calculations for the contributions to, and distribution of equalization transfers. The final fiscal
capacity is found in Table 2.2.2 of the central government reports. This figure is represented as
its real value, alongside the value of fiscal capacity per capita.

4.2 – Data on Sub-State Nationalism
The other independent variable of this study is the amount of sub-state nationalism
present within a given region of a country. For this study, the amount of sub-state nationalism of
a region will be represented using support for regional nationalist parties in their respective

Ministerio de Hacienda, “Liquidación de los recursos del sistema de financiación de las comunidades autónomas
de régimen común y ciudades con estatuto de autonomía y de las participaciones en los fondos de convergencia
autonómica, regulados en la ley 22/2009, de 18 de diciembre, correspondientes al ejercicio 2010,” Madrid, (July
2012): 13
157
Ibid
156
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elections. Ideally, universal survey data would be used to determine this, however such data is
not accessible and a proxy must therefore be used. Electoral data was operationalized to
represent sub-state nationalist sentiment by using the percentage of votes attained by regional
nationalist parties in their respective elections. In Chapter five, supplemental data may be used to
highlight year-over-year trends, given that elections do not happen every year. 158 Consequently,
the data presented for year calendar year will be recycled for all years until there is a change
through an election.
For the purpose of this study, a regional nationalist party is considered to be any party
which is active in a set region (or regions) which purports to represent regional interests. Not
included in this definition are those regional parties who are focused on specific issues unrelated
to the recognition or support of the regional identity. This determination was made through
verifying the parties’ information on their respective websites. Any party for which this data was
not clearly available was excluded from this study. 159
4.2.1 – The Netherlands
The Netherlands runs elections for all seats in the provincial legislatures simultaneously.
These elections are overseen by the Kiesraad; an advisory committee of the central
government. 160 All data on provincial elections in the Netherlands have been taken from the
Kiesraad’s website. 161 The most recent elections to the provinces were in 2019, and as such fall
outside of the timeframe of this study. The data used will be from the elections of 2007, 2011,
and 2015. The 2007 data must be used for this study because it will provide the figures for the

Supplemental data includes polling data and voter turnout for regional independence referenda, and regional
party representation in national legislatures
159
A complete register of parties included in this study can be found in Appendix 2
160
Kiesraad. “About us”, Accessed February 20th, 2021, https://english.kiesraad.nl/about-us
161
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composition of the provincial legislatures as of 2010 – the first year of this study. The 2011
election will provide data for the same year until 2014, and the 2015 election will cover the
remainder. These figures do not change year to year outside of the election as there were no
special elections during the time frame of this study.
4.2.2 – Spain
Unlike the Netherlands, elections to the legislatures of the autonomous communities are
not administered uniformly by a central authority. Rather, the elections are regulated by the
Junta Electoral Central (Central Electoral Board) under a framework which creates local
electoral commissions to administer regional elections. 162 The only commonality among the
autonomous communities is that elections are to be held on or before the fourth Sunday of May
every four years. 163 The exceptions to this rule are in the cases where snap elections are called by
the presidents of some regional assemblies, which would alter the electoral cycles of the
respective communities. 164 As with the Netherlands, data will remain constant for years where no
elections took place; only in years where there was an election, planned or snap, will data on
vote percentages change.
The parties included in the dataset for each year can be found in Appendix 3. The
inclusion of a party was based on two factors; the percentage of vote a party received, and its
ideology. Any party that received less than one percent of the vote in an election will not be
considered given that such a small presence could logically not exert enough influence to have a
significant impact on Spanish fiscal policy or intergovernmental transfer payments. The data on

LO 5/1985, 21 June, Representation of the People Institutional Act, 10
Ibid, 27
164
Ibid
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electoral results was taken primarily from each autonomous community’s legislature websites. 165
In select cases, data was taken from the Junta Electoral Central publication of results when no
such data was available from the autonomous communities.
The ideology of each party was taken primarily from their respective websites, and the
platforms contained therein. To be included, the party must have clearly displayed a regional
nationalist ideology prior to the election. This ideology was considered to be present if the
platforms specifically mentioned protection of a national language, culture, or identity,
mentioned independence from the Spanish union, or referred to the autonomous community they
were operating in as a distinct nation. If such information was not present, unclear, or
unavailable, the party was not included in the dataset for this study. In some cases, the archived
page of the party in question was used due to ongoing maintenance of the website, or
defunctness of the site as a whole.

Data was taken from legislature websites due to the simplicity and convenience of data published on these
websites.

165
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CHAPTER FIVE - ANALYSIS
5.1 – Overview
The collected data was compiled and organized in two different ways for analysis; by
year and by region. The yearly data includes all regions of a country for a given year, and the
regional data includes all data for a single region over the nine years being examined. These
micro-level analyses are relevant to the discernment of specific, individual trends over a case or
particular year, and can provide insight to which regions or years may stand out as significant in
the dataset. In addition to the micro-level analyses, a macroanalysis was conducted for each
country which included all regions across all years. This was done to observe any statistical
trends which may occur across the country at a broad level.
5.2 – Methodology
The analysis was conducted using two distinct statistical functions in SPSS. First, a
multiple regression was run to test the statistical significance of the relationship between the
dependent variable (β0) and the independent variables (β1 and β2). The multiple regression was
run on both micro and macro-level data. The data generated by the regression was used to
determine statistical significance using t score tests, the value of t being determined by:

t=

𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸

Using the value of t, it was then compared to a standard t score table at the 0.2, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02,
and 0.01 levels against the two-sided alternative to determine statistical significance. 166 Other

166

The critical values of the t distribution can be found in Appendix 4.1
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values, such as the adjusted R2 value generated by the regression were additionally used to
provide increased quantitative certainty and confidence in the data.
Following the t test, an f test was run to determine the joint significance of the variables.
This test is critical for understanding the actual relationship between the independent variables
and the dependent variable. The f test acts as a linear hypothesis test and allows for a more
accurate and definitive assessment of H0 and H1. The f test uses values from the multiple
regression found in the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table to determine the joint significance
of the variables. The formula to calculate f is as follows 167:

𝑓𝑓 = (

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹2
)(
)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

The value of f as determined by the above calculation was then tested against the relevant value
in the f score table to ascertain the level of joint significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels for
multiple regressions. 168
5.3 – The Netherlands: Macroanalysis
The macro-level data for the Netherlands was run as a multiple regression in SPSS
against β0 using β1 and β2. The value of β0 is represented as transfers per capita (€) (coded in
SPSS as TRAN_PC_EUR) from the Dutch government as specified in Chapter Four. The value
of β1 is represented as the percentage of votes received in provincial elections by nationalist
parties (coded in SPSS as VOTE). The value of β2 is represented as fiscal capacity per capita (€)
(coded as FISC_PC_EUR), as specified in Chapter Four. The degrees of freedom for the macro-

The subscript 1 in the equation denotes the “Regression” row of the ANOVA table, and the subscript 2 in the
equation denotes the “Residual” row of the ANOVA table.
168
10%, 5%, and 1% critical values of the f distribution can be found in Appendices 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 respectively.
167
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level analysis is represented by the number of cases (n), subtracting one (df = n – 1). In this case,
the degrees of freedom for the macroanalysis is 107 (120 for the purposes of t score and f tables).
For the macroanalysis regression, the model summary can be found in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1

This table indicates, through interpretation of the adjusted R2 value, that approximately 33.2
percent of the change in the dependent variable can be explained using both independent
variables as predictors while filtering out potential coincidental explanations. The output of the
multiple regression (Table 1.2) indicates the t values of the independent variables.
Table 1.2

The regression output produced a t value of 7.094 for β1, which is greater than the critical
0.01 value of the t distribution at 120 degrees of freedom (2.617). This indicates that β1 is
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statistically significant at the one percent level against the two-sided alternative. The t value of β2
is 2.696, which is also statistically significant at the one percent level against the two-sided
alternative. Using the values of the t test, the null hypothesis can confidently be rejected in this
case. The results of the regression also indicate relationships between the independent variables
and the dependent variable. In this case, for every unit change in β0 there is a 37.633 unit change
in β1. Further, for every unit change in β0 there is a 2.032 unit change in β2. These results will be
analyzed in greater detail in Chapter Six.
The linear hypothesis test for the macroanalysis using the f test was also completed. This
test value was found in the ANOVA table (Table 1.3) of the regression output.
Table 1.3

This table indicates that the f value for this regression model is 27.538. The critical value of f at
the 0.01 level observed at 120 degrees of freedom with a numerator of 2 is 4.79. The f value is
significantly greater than the critical value, which means that the null hypothesis can be
confidently rejected for the macroanalysis of the Netherlands.
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5.4 – The Netherlands: Microanalysis
For the first microanalysis, all nine years were regressed separate from each other, using
the same metrics across all 12 provinces for each year. The results can be cohesively found in
Table 1.4, where β1 is the change in units of vote percentage per one unit change in the
dependent variable, and β2 represents the change in units of fiscal capacity per capita per one unit
change of the dependent variable.
Table 1.4

†
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Year

β1

t1

β2

t2

f

2010

13.161

0.912

2.935

0.750

0.653

2011†

33.667

1.835*

1.721

0.362

1.725

2012

64.766

4.127***

6.091

1.446

9.494

2013

24.157

1.653

6.298

1.487

2.643

2014

23.194

1.824*

3.408

3.295***

7.820

2015†

27.600

1.609

2.834

0.820

1.875

2016

63.493

4.019***

2.870

1.027

8.155

2017

63.918

4.388***

2.346

1.422

9.657

2018

27.943

1.789*

1.637

0.978

1.750

Indicates an election year.

The microanalysis of the years in the Netherlands demonstrates some statistical
significance. There were four years of the nine that demonstrated clear statistical significance.

* = Statistically significant at the ten percent level
** = Statistically significant at the five percent level
*** = Statistically significant at the one percent level
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2012, 2014, 2016, and 2017 were the only years where the observed f value was greater than the
critical value at the one percent level. In three of those four years (2012, 2016, and 2017) the t
values of β1 were statistically significant at the one percent level against the two-sided
alternative. In 2014, the t value of β2 was statistically significant at the one percent level against
the two-sided alternative. Further, in 2011, 2014, and 2018 the t value of β1 is statistically
significant at the 10 percent (0.1) level.
In 2012, 2013, and 2017 the t value of β2 was statistically significant at the 20 percent
(0.2) level. These values are not within the five percent threshold, but still demonstrate a level of
statistical significance that merits discussion, especially considering the relatively small sample
size.
The second microanalysis regressed all 15 autonomous communities separate from each
other, using the same metrics across all nine years for each community. The results are found in
Table 1.5, which uses the same metrics and values as the previous table.
Table 1.5
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Province

β1

t1

β2

t2

f

Drenthe

56.238

2.099

2.322

2.746*

5.267

- 2.047

- 2.268

5.142

- 7.250

- 0.773

0.310

-7.805

- 8.032***

65.506

Flevoland
Friesland

25.932

0.257

Gelderland

170

Groningen

- 171.795

- 2.172

- 13.586

- 1.770

2.360

Limburg

- 26.927

- 0.442

1.640

0.147

0.098

Blank cells indicate regions with no votes for sub-state nationalist parties.
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North

-10.142

- 2.999**

8.994

3.310

4.013***

16.106

2.831

0.587

0.345

- 13.585

-1.736

3.015

Utrecht

3.071

5.126***

26.274

Zeeland

-12.608

- 4.236***

17.945

Brabant
North
Holland
Overijssel
South
Holland

The microanalysis of Dutch provinces also indicates some statistically significant results. While
the specific interpretations of this data will be left to the Sixth Chapter, some rudimentary
interpretation indicates that, using the f test, Flevoland has enough statistical significance at the
10 percent (0.1) level to reject the null hypothesis. Its β2 value is statistically significant at the
five percent level against the two-sided alternative, which would also lead to the rejection of the
null hypothesis.
Both Drenthe and North Brabant have enough statistical significance at the five percent
(0.05) level of the critical f value to reject the null hypothesis. Drenthe’s t scores for β1 and β2 are
statistically significant at the 10 percent and five percent levels, respectively, against the twosided alternative. The t value of β2 for North Brabant also indicates statistical significance at the
one percent level against the two-sided alternative. In both of these cases, the null hypothesis can
be rejected.
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Finally, Gelderland, North Holland, Utrecht, and Zeeland are very statistically significant
at the one percent (0.01) level when testing against the critical f value. In all four cases, the t
value of β2 is statistically significant at the one percent level against the two-sided alternative.
This would lead to a clear rejection of the null hypothesis for these case-level analyses.
5.5 – Spain: Macroanalysis
The macro-level data for Spain was run as a multiple regression in SPSS against β0 using
β1 and β2. The value of β0 is represented as transfers per capita (€) (coded in SPSS as
TRAN_PC_EUR) from the Spanish government as specified in Chapter Four. The value of β1 is
represented as the percentage of votes received in regional elections by nationalist parties (coded
in SPSS as VOTE). The value of β2 is represented as fiscal capacity per capita (€) (coded as
FISC_PC_EUR), as specified in Chapter Four. The degrees of freedom for the macro-level
analysis is represented by the number of cases (n), subtracting one (df = n – 1). In this case, the
degrees of freedom for the macroanalysis is 134 (∞ for the purposes of t score and f tables). For
the macroanalysis regression, the model summary can be found in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1

The model summary demonstrates the adjusted R2 value for the multiple regression
against the dependent variable using β1 and β2 and predictors. The adjusted R2 value of the
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multiple regression would suggest that 61.8 percent of the change in the dependent variable can
be explained by the independent variables while eliminating any explanations that could be
explained by chance. The output of the multiple regression that is used to determine the t value
can be found in Table 2.2:
Table 2.2

The output of the multiple regression shows a t value for β1 of 2.094, which is greater
than 1.960 and less than 2.326, making β1 statistically significant at the five percent (0.05) level
against the two-sided alternative. The t value for β2 is -14.728; greater than the critical value of
2.576 which would indicate that β2 is statistically significant at the one percent (0.01) level
against the two-sided alternative. The results of the multiple regression further indicate that for
every unit change of β0, there is a 3.754 unit increase in β1 and a 0.776 unit decrease in β2. This
data independently suggests that the null hypothesis should be rejected (β1 + β2 ≠ 0). However,
for further validity an f test was run to ensure accuracy and joint significance of the variables,
and for the purposes of a hypothesis test.
The f calculation for the macroanalysis of the Spanish regions was found in the ANOVA
table in the multiple regression output and can be seen in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3

As a result of this calculation, the value of f can be determined as 108.925. This value is much
greater than the critical value of 4.61, which would indicate the null hypothesis can be rejected
well above the one percent (0.01) level. Given the results of the t test and the f test, it can
confidently be assumed that the null hypothesis may be rejected in favour of H1 when
performing a macroanalysis of all Spanish regions.
5.6 – Spain: Microanalysis
For the first microanalysis, all nine years were regressed separate from each other, using
the same metrics across all 15 autonomous communities for each year. The results can be
cohesively found in Table 2.4, where β1 is the change in units of vote percentage per one unit
change in the dependent variable, and β2 represents the change in units of fiscal capacity per
capita per one unit change of the dependent variable.
Table 2.4

Multiple Regressions of Time Series Data for Spain

Year

β1

t1

β2

t2

f

2010

1.723

0.321

- 0.819

- 4.683***

10.991

2011†

4.779

0.852

- 0.808

- 4.238***

9.493
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2012

3.946

0.746

- 0.801

- 4.305***

9.765

2013

2.967

0.505

- 0.887

- 4.198***

9.074

2014

2.777

0.565

- 0.840

- 5.111***

13.526

2015†

1.657

0.284

- 0.888

- 5.086***

12.968

2016

3.194

0.648

- 0.865

- 5.998***

17.990

2017

3.963

0.834

- 0.905

- 6.758***

22.841

2018

3.644

0.721

- 0.904

- 7.090***

25.165

†

Indicates a primary election year across the standard 12 communities.

The results of the regressions indicate that a relationship between both independent variables and
the dependent variable exists. However, β1 is not statistically significant at any conventional
level, whereas β2 across all years is significant at the one percent (0.01) level against the two
sided alternative. The results of the f tests across all years are each above 6.96, which indicates a
significant rejection of the null hypothesis for the time-series microanalysis of Spanish regions.
The second microanalysis regressed all 15 autonomous communities separate from each
other, using the same metrics across all nine years for each community. The results are found in
Table 2.5, which uses the same metrics and values as the previous table.
Table 2.5
Autonomous

Multiple Regressions of Case Data for Autonomous Communities

β1

t

β2

t

f

Andalusia

4.498

0.951

0.017

0.103

0.919

Aragon

12.842

1.854

0.185

1.244

1.801

Asturias

77.216

2.906**

- 0.053

- 0.346

4.737

Community
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Balearic
Islands
Canary
Islands
Cantabria
Castile and
Léon

-1.791

- 0.287

- 0.147

- 0.696

2.114

-7.129

- 0.487

2.417

4.379*

24.723

33.096

0.895

0.181

0.930

2.529

160.278

2.676*

0.148

0.893

3.868

0.084

0.700

0.490

-0.304

-1.308

1.939

0.350

1.370

1.878

Castile La
Mancha
Catalonia

-53.736

- 0.681

Extremadura
Galicia

3.630

0.617

-0.298

-0.911

0.424

La Rioja

- 23.958

- 0.428

0.040

0.208

0.588

Madrid

-0.293

-6.049***

36.588

Murcia

0.414

1.800

3.239

- 0.077

- 0.397

2.870

Valencia

- 5.200

- 0.712

The results of the regressions for each autonomous community only produce some
statistically significant results. For example, in Aragon the t value for β1 is marginally less than
1.860, which indicates that it is almost significant at the 10 percent level (0.1) and is significant
at the 20 percent level (0.2) which would lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis in favour of
H1. However, the value of β2 is not statistically significant, and the value of f is not statistically
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significant, which therefore means the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in this case, or other
similar cases based on the f value.
Among the individual autonomous communities, only Asturias (0.1 level), the Canary
Islands (at the 0.01 level), Castile and Léon (at the 0.1 level), and Madrid (at the 0.01 level),
have f values that are statistically significant, and would therefore lead to the rejection of the null
hypothesis based on this test alone. The trends and relationships of this data, contrasted with
supplementary external sources, will be further examined in the Sixth Chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX – DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
6.1 – Discussion of the Netherlands
When interpreting the macroanalysis of data from the Netherlands, it appears at first
glance that there is a significant relationship between the percentage of votes received by
nationalist parties, the fiscal capacity of a region, and the total amount of transfers received by
each province. A significant issue with the interpretation in the Netherlands is caused by high
levels of null data; that is to say provinces with no observed sub-state nationalist sentiment. This
produces a β1 coefficient of 37.633, which is exceptionally high and likely not fully
representative of the actual effect observed. While it is still likely that β1 has an impact on β0, the
relationship itself should be examined using different metrics such as popular opinion polls,
surveys, or other methodologies to get a clearer picture of the cause and effect.
Data on the effect of β2 is likely more accurate and paints a very interesting picture. Over
the nine years and across all 12 provinces, for every unit change in transfers received per capita
(€), there is a 2.03 unit increase in fiscal capacity per person (€). This data would indicate that
provinces with lower fiscal capacity will receive less proportionately than their wealthier
counterparts. This would prima facie run counter to the generally understood purpose of
equalization payments, which more often than not tends to see those with less resources benefit
at a greater rate. However, given that the provinces of the Netherlands have extremely limited
indigenous revenue streams, the relationship of transfer payments and the wealth of the region
would likely be unconventional. A significant source of the transfers received by the provinces
of the Netherlands come from specific grants that are to be used for specific projects; as a result,
the need varies on a case-by-case basis and it not always tied to the ability of a region to generate
its own revenue, or its population.
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Compounding reliability issues with the data on the Netherlands is the adjusted R2 value.
At only 0.332 (33.2 percent), only about one-third of the variance in the dependent variable can
be explained using vote percentage for nationalist parties and fiscal capacity of the provinces.
While a low adjusted R2 value is not the determining factor in expressing validity of data, this
number does lend a decreased level of confidence in the results of the macroanalysis.
The microanalysis of time series data in the Netherlands produced an observable pattern
in its statistical significance. In both 2012 and 2016, data concerning the votes for nationalist
parties was at its highest (with one exception). Both of these years were immediately preceding
elections to the provincial legislatures. While a causative effect cannot be attributed, this is still a
significant correlation in the data which cannot be ignored. This data suggests that in the years
following an election to the regional legislatures, the effect of support for sub-state nationalist
parties has a more significant impact on intergovernmental transfer payments than other years.
The only exception noted here was in 2017, which had the highest level of statistical significance
with a t value of 4.388. While there was no provincial election in this year, there was an election
to the national House of Representatives. 171 This election saw a large boost in the popularity of
the Partij voor Vrijheid (PVV); a far-right nationalist party with an extreme focus on centralized
governance. 172 While this alone is not sufficient at explaining the increase, it could certainly
provide one explanation as to why the statistical significance of votes for nationalist parties were
more significant that year. As with all other data on the Netherlands, a broader study must be
done to attribute any level of causal implications between these statistics.

"House of Representatives March 15, 2017," Database of Election Results, March 15, 2017,
https://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK20170315
172
"Election Program," Partij Voor De Vrijheid, (2021), https://www.pvv.nl/verkiezingsprogramma.html
171
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The microanalysis of case data in the Netherlands presents highly variable results at a
case-by-case basis. However, there are some general trends that merit discussion for the purpose
of this paper. First, among the four provinces that have any levels of sub-state nationalism, only
Groningen (Figure 1.1) and Limburg (Figure 1.2) have a negative β1 coefficient. This implies
that for each unit decrease in the number of votes received by nationalist parties, there is an
increase in the amount of transfers received. In both cases, the data was not statistically
significant using either the t test or f test. These results still suggest that less votes for sub-state
nationalist parties could have a positive effect on intergovernmental transfer payments in
Groningen and Limburg.
Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.2

As can be seen in the above figures, these negative trends are not statistically significant
due to clear outliers in the data. While the negative relationship is evident, the extreme spread of
plots on the graph combined with the extremely low adjusted R2 value indicates that no causative
links can be established in this data.
Examining those provinces without sub-state nationalism as observed through regional
elections, the results tend to show high levels of statistical significance in the relationship
between β2 and β0. First, in Flevoland, Gelderland (Figure 1.3), North Brabant, South Holland,
and Zeeland there is a negative relationship between the fiscal capacity of the regions and the
transfers received by the provinces. This indicates that for each unit change in transfers received
per capita, there is a decrease in the fiscal capacity per capita of the regions. A potential
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explanatory framework could be established here using conventional equalization logic; the
lower a region’s capacity to provide services for its citizens, the more money they require from
their central government. While the relationship itself does not provide causal inference, the
prevailing logic established in the literature could lend credence to a convincing argument in
favour of one. 173
Figure 1.3

Gelderland’s negative relationship is the most statistically significant linear relationship
among those regions with negative β2 coefficients. Gelderland also has the highest adjusted R2

Hikaru Ogawa and Sayaka Yakita, “Equalization Transfers, Fiscal Decentralization, and Economic Growth,”
Public Finance Analysis 65, no 1 (March 2009): 128

173
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value at 0.888 (88.8%) which represents a clear and distinct negative linear relationship that
allows for confident rejection of the null hypothesis at the one percent level.
Inversely, Drenthe, North Holland, and Utrecht all had statistically significant positive
relationships between β2 and β0. These relationships indicate that when the provinces’ fiscal
capacities increase, so do the amount of transfers received. As with the rest of the data, no clear
causal inference can be made using this data alone, however a clear, statistically significant
relationship has been found to exist in this dataset. These findings tend to contradict with much
of the prevailing literature, which would otherwise suggest that when fiscal capacity increases,
the grants to regional government should decrease. More focused research should be done on this
to investigate the results and relationships further.
6.2 – Discussion on Spain and Comparison
The macroanalysis in Spain presents a clear, statistically significant relationship between
both independent variables and the dependent variable. It suggests that for every unit change in
transfers received per capita (€), there is a 3.754 unit increase in vote percentage for sub-state
nationalist parties and a 0.776 unit decrease in the fiscal capacity per capita (€) in the
autonomous communities. This data is statistically significant enough to confidently reject the
null hypothesis and demonstrates a clear relationship between the variables. This data also
appears to provide more realistic values than what is observed in the Netherlands’ macroanalysis.
One potential statistical explanation for this is the increased sample size for Spain – 135 versus
108. Another, and perhaps more likely explanation for this, is that Spain has much higher and
significantly more consistent levels of sub-state nationalism among its regions. In Spain, only
four out of 15 (26 percent of) autonomous communities had no observed level of sub-state
nationalism using voting patterns as a proxy. Contrasted to the eight out of 12 (66 percent of)
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Dutch provinces with no observable level of sub-state nationalism, this could explain the
considerable deviation between the two countries’ values.
Considering the same metrics were applied between both countries, the adjusted R2 value
can provide a good base to make a comparison between the results. In Spain, 61.8 percent of the
variance in the dependent variable can be explained using percentage of votes for nationalist
parties and fiscal capacity per capita (€). Contrasted to the value observed in the Netherlands
(33.2 percent), we can see a clear trend in the data which would indicate that the predictors used
in both macroanalyses are more effective at explaining the relationship in Spain than in the
Netherlands.
The time series microanalysis provides consistent and clear results across all nine years
of study. In every case, the fiscal capacity per capita (€) was very statistically significant, and
across all years demonstrated a negative relationship. There was no apparent pattern or trend that
was observed year over year for β2, however looking at the years of the elections there appear to
be some minor trends. In 2011, the first year of the dataset where an election was held, the time
series β1 coefficient saw its highest value at 4.779 and its second lowest β2 coefficient at – 0.808.
However in the year of the next election, 2015, the β1 coefficient value was at its lowest (1.657),
and the β2 coefficient value was at its third highest (-0.888). In fact, beginning in 2011, Spanish
regions saw significant decreases in the β1 coefficient year-over-year, culminating in that lowest
value in 2015. The value increased significantly in the following year and remained steadily high
in each following year. This suggests a trend that would certainly require a broader time frame to
effectively analyze to extrapolate a meaningful pattern; that in the years following an election,
support for nationalist parties becomes a less meaningful predictor of transfer payments until the
next election, where it experiences increased significance.
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The case data microanalysis showed a greater variance between cases, and fewer
significant trends. Some interesting cases will be discussed however, given their outliers in the
datasets. For example in Asturias, the vote percentage appeared to be a significant predictor for
the transfers received per capita (€). While the β1 value appears exceptionally high (77.216), this
is likely due to two factors; a small sample size, and the region only demonstrating sub-state
nationalism through the proxy of vote percentage in one year (2010). A visualization of the data
(Figure 2.1) provides a clear picture of the results that could significantly explain the
observations of β1.
Figure 2.1

The simple scatter graph clearly indicates that in the single year that sub-state nationalist parties
received votes, they received more transfers per capita. A similar trend is observed in Castile and
Leon (Figure 2.2). While these relationships cannot be considered causative, their statistical
significance perhaps merits further discussion.
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Figure 2.2

In some conventionally more nationalistic autonomous communities, notably the Canary Islands
(Figures 2.3 and 2.4) and Valencia (Figure 2.5), there is generally a negative relationship
between β1 and β0. There is no statistical significance at a conventional level in any of these
autonomous communities individually, however it is still notable for two reasons. First, the
variance in vote percentage between elections is often not extreme. Second, the sample size of
nine is likely not large enough to provide a statistically significant trend when coupled with the
generally low variance. A clear relationship between the variables is still present, and in spite of
its lack of statistical significance merits at least a cursory discussion. Catalonia (Figure 2.6) was
an exception to the more nationalistic communities, seeing an, albeit statistically insignificant,
positive relationship between vote percentage and incoming transfers.
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Figure 2.3

This visualization of the data in the Canary Islands over the nine-year period of the study clearly
indicates a trend that when vote percentage for sub-state nationalist parties is higher, the
autonomous community receives fewer fiscal transfers from the Spanish government. Inversely,
they are the only autonomous community that has an observed positive β2 coefficient that is
statistically significant against the two-sided alternative at the five percent level.
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Figure 2.4

Table 3.4 represents a highly significant linear model that clearly demonstrates a positive
relationship between an increase in fiscal capacity and an increase in intergovernmental
transfers. They are the only autonomous community that saw a highly statistically significant
positive relationship against the two-sided alternative in β2.
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Figure 2.5

This data visualization for Valencia demonstrates, as with the Canary Islands, that when votes
for sub-state nationalist parties are high, the amount of transfers received by the government tend
to be much lower. Much like the Canary Islands, the sample size is not large enough to make a
statistically significant observation, however the trend would indicate that more research could
be done to investigate this trend more in depth.

64

Figure 2.6

The visualization of data for Catalonia demonstrates a positive relationship, though with extreme
variance of results. Given the tumultuous nature of Catalan-Spanish relations, and the domestic
political unease in the region, a separate study should be undertaken to examine Catalonia more
closely.
One final case in Spain that is worth discussing in Galicia (Figure 2.7). This is another
region with a generally strong regional identity and language, and a relatively strong presence of
regional nationalist parties. Unlike other regions which displayed some sort of pattern or trend,
Galicia’s relationship between vote percentage and transfers per capita is virtually non-existent.
There is no apparent explanation as to why Galicia appears to differ from other regions, but
perhaps could be explained through further examination of its history and economic conditions.
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Figure 2.7

In the case of regions without levels of sub-state nationalism, there was no apparent
relationship or trends in the data that is statistically significant at conventional levels. As such,
this aspect of the data will not be examined in depth, however one interesting observation was
made. Only Madrid had a negative relationship between β0 and β2; for every one unit change in
the dependent variable there was a decrease of 0.293 units in fiscal capacity per capita. Why the
other three autonomous communities that did not display any observable level of sub-state
nationalism demonstrated (albeit statistically insignificant) positive relationships cannot be
answered with this dataset. This is a further realm of study which could be expanded.
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CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
The data collected and analyzed for this study demonstrates that there is a statistically
significant relationship between sub-state nationalism and intergovernmental transfer payments.
On average, intergovernmental transfer payments to regional governments increased when
support for sub-state nationalist parties did as well. What was observed in the Netherlands was a
positive relationship overall between fiscal capacity of provinces and the transfers received,
whereas in Spain there was a negative relationship. There is no clear explanation in theory
surrounding equalization and intergovernmental transfers that would explain the Netherlands’
positive relationship between these two variables. As such, this is a gap in the literature that
could potentially be filled with more research on the topic, as this paper’s scope and limitations
cannot effectively provide an explanation to this observation.
The micro-level analyses performed on both countries found some statistically significant
data. The time series data in both countries tended to coalesce around election years in its
significance both in terms of dips and spikes in relevance. This trend cannot be explained using
the data available, nor with any of the prevailing literature on fiscal policy or intergovernmental
transfers. This is a particularly interesting phenomenon that certainly merits study both in terms
of increased scope of cases and time. At a case level, contrary to popular wisdom and belief
Catalonia, one of the most internationally recognizable cases of sub-state nationalism, saw no
clear trend or statistically significant relationship between intergovernmental transfer payments
and support for sub-state nationalism. Other traditionally nationalistic regions of Spain such as
the Canary Islands and Valencia actually saw negative relationships between support for substate nationalism and intergovernmental transfers; the Canary Islands also the only community
that saw transfers increase clearly with fiscal capacity.
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Overall, there is significant and interesting data that has come from this study. Some clear
macro-level trends reinforce existing literature, especially regarding Spain. The data also
highlights a gap in the literature, specifically when examining the Netherlands and their positive
relationship between fiscal capacity and intergovernmental transfers. This study therefore
provides the basis of potential future research on this subject that might be able to fill said gap;
either by examining the Netherlands more in depth or studying other unitary states where
regional governments have limited revenue-generating power. For the micro-level data, the data
was, in many instances, statistically significant. This could also lend itself as an introduction to
further research to perhaps lend causative explanations for the trends observed in this study, or to
expose new trends as the years progress and political landscapes shift.
The limitations of the relatively short time frame and limited availability of data and
resources presented an impediment to the ability to make causative arguments in this study.
However, the statistical significance and clear relationships present within the data suggest that
this research should act as a stepping-stone to further studies on this topic. While the paper does
fill some gaps, a significant amount can and should be explored in much greater detail through
further studies using a broader time frame, expanded set of predictors, and greater resources to
provide answers to some of the results found here. These limitations, if overcome, would likely
be able to significantly advance the study of regional identities as they relate to domestic fiscal
policy.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1.1 – Exclusion of Provincial Functions Benefits 2010-2016 (NL)
Function Excluded

Reason for
Exclusion

Function
Classification

Variable
Denomination

Administrative
Organization

Municipal relations

General Management

g10

Financial Supervision

Municipal relations

General Management

g11

Qualitative
Groundwater and Soil
Management

Municipal relations

Environmental
Management

g12

Promotion of Economic
Activities

European Union
funding

Economic and
Agricultural Affairs

g13

Utilities

Private corporation

Economic and
Agricultural Affairs

g14

Urban Renewal

Municipal Relations

Spatial Planning and
Public Housing

g15

Appendix 1.2 – Grant Transfer Variables 2010-2016 (NL)
Function and
Variable

Function
Classification

Dataset Code

Variable
Calculation

Total General
Management (m)

General Management

g1

g1 = m – g10 – g11

Total Public Order
and Safety (p)

Public Order and
Safety

g2

g2 = p

Total Traffic and
Transport (t)

Traffic and Transport

g3

g3 = t

Total Water
Management (w)

Water Management

g4

g4 = w

Total Environmental
Management (e)

Environmental
Management

g5

g5 = e – g12
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Total Recreation and
Nature (r)

Recreation and
Nature

g6

g6 = r

Total Economic and
Agricultural Affairs
(a)

Economic and
Agricultural Affairs

g7

g7 = a – g13 – g14

Total Wellness (l)

Welfare

g8

g8 = l

Total Spatial Order
and Public Housing
(h)

Spatial Planning and
Public Housing

g9

g9 = h – g15

Appendix 1.3 – Grant Transfer Variables 2017 and 2018 (NL)
Function and Variable

Function Classification

Total General
Administration

General Management

Total Traffic and Transport

Traffic and Transport

g2

Total Water

Water Management

g3

Environmental Management

g4

Recreation and Nature

g5

Total Regional Economy

Economic and Agricultural
Affairs

g6

Total Culture and Society

Welfare

g7

Total Space

Spatial Planning and Public
Housing

g8

Total Environment
Total Nature
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Dataset Code
g1

Appendix 2.1 – Regional Parties in The Netherlands from 2007-2010
Region
Drenthe
Flevoland
Friesland
Gelderland
Groningen
Limburg
North Brabant
North Holland
Overijssel
South Holland
Utrecht
Zeeland

Parties Included in Dataset 2010
Onafhankelijke Partij Drenthe (OPD) 174, Partij voor het Noorden
(PVN) 175
None
Fryske Nasjonale Partij (FNP) 176, PVN
None
PVN
Partij Nieuw Limburg (PNL) 177
None
None
None
None
None
None

Appendix 2.2 – Regional Parties in the Netherlands from 2011-2014
Region
Drenthe
Flevoland
Friesland
Gelderland
Groningen
Limburg
North Brabant
North Holland
Overijssel
South Holland
Utrecht
Zeeland

Parties Included in Datasets FY12-FY16
OPD
None
FNP, Provinciaal Belang Fryslân 178, PVN
None
PVN
PNL
None
None
None
None
None
None

Onafhankelijke Partij Drenthe. “OPD.” Accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.opd.nl/
Partij voor het Noorden. “The Origin of the Party for the North,” accessed March 4th, 2021,
https://www.partijvoorhetnoorden.nl/partij/de-oorsprong-van-de-partij-voor-het-noorden/
176
Frisian National Party, “About the Frisian National Party,” accessed March 4th, 2020,
https://www.fnp.frl/frysk/fnp-fryslan/fryske-nasjonale-partij/
177
Partij Nieuw Limburg, “PNL Election Program,” Wayback Machine, accessed March 4th, 20201,
https://web.archive.org/web/20051219230236/http://www.partijnieuwlimburg.nl/pages/pr ogramma.htm
178
Provinciaal Belang Fryslan, “About,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.provinciaalbelangfriesland.nl/departij/
174
175
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Appendix 2.3 – Regional Parties in the Netherlands from 2015-2019
Region
Drenthe
Flevoland
Friesland
Gelderland
Groningen
Limburg
North Brabant
North Holland
Overijssel
South Holland
Utrecht
Zeeland

Parties Included in Datasets FY12-FY16
None
None
FNP
None
PVN
Lokaal-Limburg 179
None
None
None
None
None
None

Appendix 3.1 – Regional Parties in Spain (2010)
Autonomous
Community
Andalusia
Aragon
Asturias
Balearic Islands
Canary Islands
Cantabria
Castile – La Mancha
Castile and Leon

Parties Included in Dataset

Electoral Period (Years)

Andalusian Party (PA) 180
Aragonese Party (PAR) 181, Aragonese
Union (CHA) 182
Asturian Party (PAS) 183
Unio Mallorquina (UM)
Canarian Coalition 184, New Canaries 185
Regionalist Party of Cantabria (PRC) 186
None
Leonese People’s Union (UPL) 187

2008-2012
2007-2011
2007-2011
2007-2011
2007-2011
2007-2011
2007-2011
2007-2011

Lokaal-Limburg, “Local Limburg,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://lokaal-limburg.nl/lokaal-limburg/
Andalusian Party, “Nacional Andalucista,” Wayback Machine, accessed March 4th, 2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150214050113/http://nacional.andalucista.org/
181
Aragonese Party, “Our Party,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://www.partidoaragones.es/nuestro-partido/
182
Aragonese Union, “History,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.chunta.org/somos/nuestra-historia/
183
Asturian Party, “Principles and Objectives,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://asturianista.es/
184
Canarian Coalition, “History and Ideology,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://coalicioncanaria.org/historia-eideologia/
185
New Canaries, “About us,” Wayback Machine, accessed March 4th, 2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20180720155535/http://www.nuevacanarias.org/index.php/QuienesSomos/quienessomos.html
186
Regionalist Part of Cantabria, “About us,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://prc.es/prc.php/web/quienessomos
187
Leonese People’s Union, “About us,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.upl.es/quienes-somos/
179
180
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Catalonia
Extremadura
Galicia
La Rioja
Madrid
Murcia
Valencia

Convergencia I Unio (CiU), Esquerra
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) 188,
Catalan Solidarity for Independence
(SI) 189
None
Galician National Bloc (BNG) 190
Riojan Party (PR) 191
None
None
Valencian Nationalist Bloc 192

Rows in italics indicate elections outside the regular timeframe

2010-2012
2007-2011
2009-2012
2007-2011
2007-2011
2007-2011
2007-2011

Appendix 3.2 – Regional Parties in Spain (2011-2014)
Autonomous Community
Andalusia
Aragon
Asturias
Balearic Islands
Canary Islands
Cantabria
Castile – La Mancha
Castile and Leon
Catalonia
Extremadura
Galicia
La Rioja
Madrid
Murcia
Valencia

Parties Included in Dataset
PA
PAR, CHA
None
Convergence for the Isles 193
(CxI)
Canarian Coalition, New
Canaries
PRC
None
UPL
CiU, ERC, SI
None
BNG
PR
None
None
Valencian Nationalist Bloc

Electoral Period
2008-2012
2011-2015
2011-2015
2011-2015
2011-2015
2011-2015
2011-2015
2011-2015
2010-2012
2011-2015
2009-2012
2011-2015
2011-2015
2011-2015
2011-2015

Esquerra Republicana, “What we are,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/que-som
Catalan Solidarity for Independence, “Sectoral Proposal,” accessed March 4th, 2021,
http://www.solidaritat.cat/pagina/propostes-sectorials/
190
Galician National Bloc, “Principals, Ideologies, and Values of BNG,” accessed March 4th, 2021,
https://www.bng.gal/estaticas/principios-do-bng.html
191
Riojan Party, “Ideology,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://www.partidoriojano.es/ideologia/
192
Valencian National Bloc, “Who are we?” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://bloc.compromis.net/info/qui-som/
193
“The Formation of the Jaume Font and Josep Melia is called Proposta per les Illes,” El Mundo, February 11th,
2012. Accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/11/02/baleares/1351874489.html
188
189
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Appendix 3.3 – Autonomous Communities with Electoral Changes in 2012
Autonomous Community
Andalusia
Catalonia
Galicia

Parties Included in Dataset
PA
CiU, ERC-Cat Si 194, Popular
Unity Candidacy (CUP) 195, SI
BNG

Electoral Period
2012-2015
2012-2015
2012-2016

Appendix 3.4 – Regional Parties in Spain (2015-2018)
Autonomous Community
Andalusia
Aragon
Asturias
Balearic Islands
Canary Islands
Cantabria
Castile – La Mancha
Castile and Leon
Catalonia
Extremadura
Galicia
La Rioja
Madrid
Murcia
Valencia

Parties Included in Dataset
PA
PAR, CHA
None
More for Mallorca 196,
Proposal for the Isles (El Pi),
More for Menorca 197
Canarian Coalition, New
Canaries
PRC
None
UPL
Together for Yes (JxSi) 198,
CUP
None
BNG
PR
None
None
Valencian Nationalist Bloc

Electoral Period
2015-2018
2015-2019
2015-2019
2015-2019
2015-2019
2015-2019
2015-2019
2015-2019
2015-2017
2015-2019
2012-2016
2015-2019
2015-2019
2015-2019
2015-2019

Appendix 3.5 – Autonomous Communities with Electoral Changes in 2016
Autonomous Community
Galicia

Parties Included in Dataset
In Tide (EM) 199, BNG

Electoral Period
2016-2020

Re-named ERC party – source remains the same
Popular Unity Candidacy, “Home,” accessed March 6th, 2021, https://perguanyar.cat/
196
More for Mallorca, “Who are we,” accessed March 6th, 2021, https://www.mespermallorca.cat/el-nostreprojecte/qui-som/
197
More for Menorca, “Who are we?” accessed March 7th, 2021, https://www.mespermenorca.cat/ca/inici/
198
Together for Yes, “About us,” Wayback Machine, accessed March 7th, 2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160916035051/http://www.juntspelsi.cat/qui_som?locale= es
199
In Tide, “Basic Principles,” accessed March 10th, 2021, https://enmarea.gal/principios-basicos/
194
195
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Appendix 3.6 – Autonomous Communities with Electoral Changes in 2017
Autonomous Community
Catalonia*

Parties Included in Dataset
JuntsxCat 200, ERC-CatSi,
CUP

Electoral Period
2017-2021

*Election was called due to attempted secession from the Spanish union – Catalan legislature was dissolved by the
Spanish government

Appendix 3.7 – Autonomous Communities with Electoral Changes in 2018
Autonomous Community
Andalusia

200
201

Parties Included in Dataset
Adelante Andalusia 201

Electoral Period
2018-2022

Reformation of Juntsx Party that participated in the 2015 election.
Adelante Andealucia, “Election Program,” accessed March 10th, 2021, https://adelanteandalucia.org/epigrafe/00/
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Appendix 4.1 – Critical Values of the t Distribution
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Appendix 4.2 – 10% Critical Value of the F Distribution
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Appendix 4.3 – 5% Critical Value of the F Distribution
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Appendix 4.4 – 1 % Critical Value of the F Distribution
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